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Weeden: The Effect of Section 706 State Agency Proceedings upon Subsequen

THE EFFECT OF SECTION 706 STATE AGENCY
PROCEEDINGS UPON SUBSEQUENT TITLE VII
CLAIMS
LARRY

I.

D.

WEEDEN*

INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' "provides for consideration
of employment discrimination claims in several forums." 2 A Title VII
claimant may file a charge with a state agency or state court, a federal
agency or a federal court. Under the deferral scheme of section 706 of
the Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
may designate a qualified state entity as a section 706 agency to first
consider a charge of employment discrimination.' The EEOC is required to give the designated section 706 agency a chance to settle a
Title VII complaint. If the section 706 agency fails to settle the complaint to a claimant's satisfaction, he or she may file a charge with the
EEOC.
The deferral of an employment discrimination complaint to a state
agency, as authorized by section 706, is possible only if the state or
local government has a law in force prohibiting employment discrimination. 4 The deferral to state agencies is an implementation of congressional intent to allow state and federal authorities to work together
to eliminate employment discrimination.5 Those legislators who sponsored Title VII intended for the federal protections against employAssistant Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University; B.A., J.D., University of
Mississippi; M.A. Antioch School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
3. 706 Agency Designation Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70 (1982). Under the section 706
deferral scheme, the EEOC has designated several states and local fair employment practice agencies as 706 agencies. The qualifications for designation under section 706(c) are as follows:
(1)That the state or political subdivision has a fair employment practice law which makes
unlawful employment practices based upon race, color, religion, sex or national origin; and
(2) That the state or political subdivision has either established a state or local authority or
authorized an existing state or local authority that is empowered with respect to employment
practices found to be unlawful, to do one of three things: to grant relief from the practice; to
seek relief from practice; or to institute criminal proceedings with respect to the practice. Id.
4. Id.
5. Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The ProperRole of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1492-1501 (1981).
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ment discrimination to supplement state protections.6
The actions of state section 706 agencies take various forms. Some
agencies perform an investigatory function to determine if cause exists
to believe that an employer has unlawfully discriminated against the
complainant. A good deal of state agency work is devoted to the reconciliation of differences between the employer and the complainant.
Some state agencies conduct adjudicatory hearings which facilitate a
full consideration of the merits of an employment discrimination claim.
They act, in effect, as judicial forums.
Some state administrative agency procedures provide for the judicial
review of agency decisions by the state's appellate courts.' After the
state agency has issued its final orders a complainant may seek review
of the agency action by the state's courts, and, if still unsatisfied, file a
charge with the EEOC. However, the complainant may forego state
judicial review and file a charge directly with the EEOC.
If the complainant files a charge with the EEOC, that agency is required to conduct an investigation to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the discrimination charge is true. 8 In
making its determination, the EEOC must accord substantial weight to
a state agency's final orders.9 If it finds no reasonable cause to believe
that the charge is true, the EEOC dismisses the charge and the complainant may bring suit in federal court.
A federal court considering an employment discrimination claim
which was first brought in a section 706 state agency must decide what
effect to afford the state agency action. The well-established rule is that
decisions made by a state agency acting as a judicial forum are afforded
preclusive effect.'I The Supreme Court suggested in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. " that it would not grant full faith and credit to
the decision of a section 706 agency acting as a judicial forum. Such a
failure to grant preclusive effect is a misapplication of both res judicata
and collateral estoppel concepts.
The Kremer Court articulated the view that since decisions by the
EEOC do not preclude a trial de novo in federal court, "it is clear that
unreviewed administrative determinations by state agencies also should
not preclude such review even if such a decision were to be afforded
preclusive effect in a State's own court."'

2

The Kremer Court's state-

6. Id.
7. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 298 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1981-82).
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1983).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
10. See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966), and cases
cited therein.
11. 456 U.S. 461, 470 n.7 (1982).
12. Id.
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ment that administrative decisions unreviewed by state courts are not
entitled to the protection of the full faith and credit provisions, merely
because EEOC decisions are properly denied the protection of the preclusion rational, has inadvertently effected an "implied repeal" of section 173813 and section 1739'" without a proper analysis.
This article criticizes the Kremer dicta and posits a basis for a proper
relationship between the limited deferral provisions of section 706(c) of
Title VII and the full faith and credit clause.15
II.

FACTS OF THE KREMER DECISION

In 1973 Rubin Kremer was hired by respondent Chemical Construction Corporation [Chemico] as an engineer. Two years later he and
other employees were laid off. Subsequently, some of the other laid off
employees were rehired, but Kremer was not. In 1976 Kremer filed a
charge with the EEOC alleging that he was discriminated against because of his Jewish national origin and religious beliefs, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 Because of Title VII's
deferral provisions,' 7 the EEOC was required to refer Kremer's charge
to the New York State Division of Human Rights (NYHRD), the
agency charged with enforcing the New York law prohibiting employment discrimination.
After investigating Kremer's complaint, NYHRD concluded there
was no probable cause to believe that Chemico had been discriminatory and dismissed the complaint. The NYHRD's determination was
"upheld by its Appeal Board" as "not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse
of discretion."' 8 The Appeal Board's decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. 9 Subsequently, an
EEOC official ruled there was no reasonable cause to believe the dis13. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). In a state or political subdivision which comes under the scope
of section 706(c), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), the Supreme Court cannot deny
full faith and credit to unreviewed decisions of a section 706 agency without effecting an implied
repeal of section 1738.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (1982). In language similar to section 1738, section 1739 provides that
all nonjudicial records or books kept in public office are entitled to full faith and credit if such a
nonjudicial record were to be afforded preclusive effect in a state's own courts.
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every state. And the Congress may by general
laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."
16. Title VII provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against an individual with respect to his or her employment privileges because of his
religion or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
17. Id. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). Under Title VII's deferral provision, the EEOC cannot consider
a claim before a state agency having jurisdiction over employment discrimination complaints has
had sixty days to adjust the complaint.
18. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 464.
19. Id.
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crimination charge was true and issued a right-to-sue letter. Kremer
filed a Title VII action in federal district court. The district court claim
was dismissed on grounds of res judicata and the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed.2" The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve this important issue of federal employment discrimination law
over which the Courts of Appeals are divided."'"
III.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE KREMER

OPINION

The Kremer Court relied on the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
which requires federal courts to afford to a state court judgment the
same full faith and credit that would apply in the state's own courts. In
an opinion delivered by Justice White, the Court reasoned that section
1738 precludes the relitigation of an employment discrimination issue
in federal court unless Congress intended that Title VII cases be exempt from the general preclusion rule.2 2 The majority's reasoning was
attacked in a dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. The Blackmun dissent rejected the majority conclusion that there is "nothing in Title VII inconsistent with the
application of the general preclusion rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to the
state court's affirmance of the state agency's decision."23
The Blackmun dissent's argument is more persuasive than the majority's, but it may not be accurate. The legislative history of Title VII
does not explicitly demonstrate that Congress contemplated relitigation
of a discrimination claim in federal court, except where "the complainant had already lost a trial on the merits in the state court. '24 The flaw
in Justice Blackmun's analysis indicates that he may have unwittingly
accepted the majority's poorly articulated rationale for applying the res
judicata concept to a full judicial hearing on the merits, but not to a full
administrative hearing on the merits in a Title -VII claim.2 5 Justice
Blackmun indicated that he was willing to apply the res judicata principle to state judicial hearings where the employee had a full opportunity
20. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980).
21. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466 n.5. "Three Courts of Appeals have held that a federal court
may not attribute preclusive deference to prior state court decisions reviewing state agency determinations." Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Unger v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cer. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980). The Second Circuit's holding in
Kremer was in conflict with these three circuits. See also Kremer where the holding was in conflict
with these three circuits. See also Aleem v. General Felt Indus., Inc., 661 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir.
1981).
22. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 476.
23. Id. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 508.
25. Id. See also id. at 494 n.10. "[Tihe policies favoring preclusion under 28 U.S.C. § 1738
would be considerably stronger if the merits of the discrimination claim had been settled by the
state court itself."
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to litigate his claims on the merits. He did not, however, indicate a
desire to apply preclusion principles to judicially unreviewed state administrative decisions. The full faith and credit provision of section
1738 dictates that courts apply the res judicata concept to both state
judicial and administrative determinations. 26 Justice Blackmun describes "the Court's decision [as] artificially separat[ing] the proceeding
before the reviewing state court from the state administrative process." 27 However, he appears ready to adopt the rule of preclusion
when a Title VII plaintiff has had a full and fair adjudication on the
merits in state court, as articulated in Moosavic v. Fairfax County Board
of Education,28 without applying traditional res judicata concepts to
certain administrative decisions.
In Kremer, the majority stated that Blackmun's reading of Moosavic
suggests he agrees with the majority's mechanical application of the full
faith and credit provisions to full judicial hearings without according
any of the preclusion principles to state administrative decisions that
have not been subjected to judicial review.2 9 The majority opinion
should not have artificially separated the proceedings before the reviewing court and the administrative agency because section 1738 requires that full faith and credit be given to both judicial and
administrative decisions.
Justice Stevens stated in a separate dissenting opinion that "the majority concedes that state agency proceedings will not bar a federal
claim under Title VII and Justice Blackmun assumes arguendo that a
state court decision on the merits of a discrimination claim would cre"3o The majority opinion improperly reasoned
ate such a bar .
[s]ince it is settled that decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a trial de
novo in federal court, it is clear that unreviewed administrative determinations by state agencies also should not preclude such review even

if such 3a decision were to be afforded preclusive effect in a State's own
courts. 1

The majority opinion fails to critically evaluate the nature of decisions
26. See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966).
27. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 490 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
28. 666 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1981) (Title VII plaintiff collaterally estopped in federal court after
a full hearing and trial in state court resulting in a decision). See also supra note 25.
29. "Although a superficial reading of section 1738 might suggest otherwise, the more reasonable view is that the section applies to final unreviewed administrative decisions rendered in a
judicial capacity. Both the full faith and credit clause and section 1738, by their terms, apply only
to judicial proceedings. Although a reading of this language that excludes administrative decisions is tenable, the purposes of section 1738, accepted rules of res judicata, and the case law all
point to a broader construction. To decide whether certain types of hearings are 'judicial proceedings,' courts should ignore the label affixed to the deciding tribunal and evaluate the actual nature
of the proceedings." Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1520-21.
30. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 508-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 470 n.7.
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rendered by the EEOC under Title VII since the EEOC does not have
any adjudicatory decision making powers in Title VII litigation.3 2
State administrative agencies often do have such adjudicatory power.
Under Title VII's deferral provisions, if an act of employment discrimination takes place in a state or local government entity which has
adequate laws forbidding unfair employment practices, the EEOC
must refer the charge to the local or state agency. If the local or state
authority fails to resolve the complaint in a timely fashion, the complainant may file his complaint with the EEOC.3 3 The EEOC investigates the charge. If the EEOC investigation establishes reasonable
cause to believe that illegal employment discrimination has taken
place, it will use conciliation to try to correct the unlawful employment
practice.3 4 If conciliation fails, the EEOC can enforce the act by filing
a civil action in the appropriate federal court.35
The Kremer Court's conclusion is correct that a decision rendered by
the EEOC should not be awarded preclusive effect under res judicata
principles. Title VII's legislative history clearly demonstrates that Congress did not want the EEOC to have adjudicatory powers because it
wanted the employer to have a hearing in a federal court and not be
subjected to the EEOC's perceived institutional bias.36 The Kremer
Court is correct in concluding that an EEOC decision under Title VII
does not prevent a federal trial de novo. The Court fails to demonstrate
with adequate analysis its basis for reasoning that state administrative
decisions unreviewed by state courts should automatically be denied
res judicata effect, while those state decisions which have been reviewed by state courts are automatically granted preclusive effect. Justice Blackmun says in Kremer3 7 that Title VII claimants get a trial de
novo in federal court but at that trial the federal court must adopt state
court findings because of 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Thus, a claimant does not
get a real trial de novo when he appeals the state administrative hearing
result to the state court. When the claimant appeals to state court, he
does not get a trial de novo in federal court because the federal court
will adopt the findings of the state court because of section 1739 res
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 2000e-5(f). The [EEOC] may bring a civil action against any respondent not a
government, governmental agency or political subdivision named in the charge. In the case of a
respondent which is a government, governmental agency or political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and shall refer the case to the Attorney
General who may bring a civil action against such respondent in the appropriate United States
District Court. d
36. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 474 n.15 and authorities cited therein.
37. Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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judicata. The only way a claimant can get a trial de novo is if he does
not appeal the state agency decision to state court but files a claim in
federal court instead.
Congress did not intend to allow the limited EEOC nonjudicial administrative investigation to prevent the Title VII litigant from his day
in a federal court.38 It is equally clear that Congress did not intend for
the EEOC to adjudicate Title VII claims on their merits. It is not clear
what relationship exists between Title VII's limited deferral provisions
under section 706 and the full faith and credit provisions of sections
1738 and 1739 for those state administrative agencies in states which
may have adequate laws to resolve Title VII complaints through administrative adjudication rather than administrative investigation. The
Kremer Court merely describes the proper relationship under Title
VII's limited deferral provisions between the EEOC and the appropriate state administrative agency, 39 which involves the EEOC's consideration of a discrimination complaint only after the state agency has had
an opportunity to resolve the controversy. The Kremer Court does not
properly describe the relationship between Title VII's deferral provisions, the appropriate state section 706 administrative agency's decisions, and the full faith and credit provisions.
The basis for the Court's unexplained rationale for refusing to apply
the full faith and credit provision to an adjudicated state administrative
decision is highlighted in the dictum. ° The Court concludes in summary fashion that since Congress did not intend for the EEOC's adjustment of a Title VII complaint to prevent a trial de novo, it necessarily
follows that state administrative decisions not reviewed by a state court
should not be given preclusive effect. 4 The Court's rationale will not
stand close scrutiny because the Court ignores the broader purpose of
the full faith and credit section of Title 28. Further, the Kremer Court
could "have ignored the label affixed to the deciding tribunal, and evaluate[d] the actual nature of the [administrative agency] proceedings"
before deciding whether the agency decision was entitled to preclusive
effect.12 The effect of the automatic denial of preclusive effect to unreviewed state administrative decisions takes away the incentive for states
to adopt substantive and procedural provisions identical to those of Title VII. The Supreme Court has unfortunately equated the role of state
administrative agencies in resolving Title VII complaints to that of the
38. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 i U.S. 792 (1973); Chandler v. Roudebush,
425 U.S. 840 (1976).
39. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468-69. Clearly, Congress intended that state anti-discrimination
laws play an important role in the fight against employment discrimination.
40. Id. at 470 n.7.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 29.
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EEOC. However, the two entities often employ different procedures.
"Most states afford both investigatory review similar to that provided
by the EEOC and
full scale evidentiary hearings before an administra43
tive tribunal.
The EEOC is not authorized to conduct a full scale evidentiary hearing on Title VII charges. A charge of discrimination is filed with the
EEOC to trigger investigatory and conciliatory procedures of that
agency under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(b), and not to trigger a lawsuit. 4 In
deciding whether there is probable cause to believe that a person's
charge of discrimination is true, the EEOC is not bound by the determination of a state or local deferral agency. The Commission is required to accord only substantial weight to final findings and orders
made by state or local authorities in proceedings conducted under the
requirements of Title VII deferral provisions.4 5
The Kremer decision presents more than a question of deferral to a
state or local authority. The broad policy issue presented by the
Kremer decision requires analysis of the relationship between the full
faith and credit provisions of Title 28 and the substantive and procedural rights of a Title VII litigant who files a charge in a jurisdiction
where the EEOC is required to give substantial weight to the findings
of state or local proceedings.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun points out that "the
Court, as it must, concedes that a state agency determination does not
preclude a trial de novo in federal district court. .

.

. Congress made

it clear beyond doubt that state agency findings would not prevent the
Title VII complainant from filing suit in federal court. ' 46 Justice
Blackmun's assertion concerning the role of state agencies may not be
valid. Congress was careful to draft legislation defining the limited role
it wanted the EEOC to have in investigating and not adjudicating Title
VII complaints.47 Congress was not clear about what effect full faith
and credit provisions should have on adjudicated unreviewed state ad43. Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1486; e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 12963,
12967-69 (Deering Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.06 (West 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68,

§§ 7-102(c), 8-106 (1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548 (602) (1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 294, 297
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (Page 1980) citedin Jackson,
Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1486 n.8.
44. Smith v. Joseph Home Co., 438 F. Supp. 1207 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
46. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 487 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin 1964 U.S. CODE CONG., &
AD NEWS 2355, 2487, 2515 (additional views of Representatives McCulloch, Lindsay, Cahill,
Shriver, McGregor, Mathias, and Bromwell). "As the title was originally worded the [EEOC]
would have had authority to not only conduct investigations, but also institute hearing procedures
and issue orders of a cease-and-desist nature. A substantial number of committee members, however, preferred that ihe ultimate determination of discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary."
1d. at 2515.
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ministrative decisions rendered pursuant to Title VII deferral provisions."a "Nothing in the Act prevents a complainant from suing in
federal court after a state has adjudicated his claim. 9
The important question for consideration under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
5(b) is not whether Congress intended for state proceedings to have
preclusive effect on the EEOC. Rather, the question is whether this
deferral "provision which is addressed to EEOC rather than the
Courts" 50 is indicative of a congressional policy to abandon the general
rule that a legal claim once decided in an administrative forum of competent jurisdiction is to be afforded the protection of the full faith and
credit doctrine where such a decision would be afforded preclusive effect in a state's own courts. 5 '
Res judicata is typically applied only where there has been a prior
judicial proceeding. However, the Supreme Court has stated that
"[wihen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and
resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have
had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to
apply res judicata to enforce repose."52
The Supreme Court should decide at the appropriate time whether a
federal court in a Title VII case should give preclusive effect to a section 706 state administrative agency's adjudication of an employment
claim when the parties have had "a full and fair opportunity to litigate" 53 and the administrative decision would be res judicata in the
state's own courts. As a general rule, "the full faith and credit clause
principles to unreand section 1738 require application of preclusion
'54
viewed state administrative adjudications.
Title VII substantial weight directives and preclusion principles were
designed to increase deference to state decisions.5 5 The Kremer Court
correctly rejected the contention that Title VII's "substantial weight directive"5 6 implicitly overruled section 1738's application to state court
48. "The unusual circumstances surrounding Title VIT's enactment make analysis especially
difficult [citation omitted]. Unfortunately, courts interpreting Title VII do not have the benefit of
legislative reports, which are traditionally considered among the most illuminating and reliable
indicators of Congress's intent." Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1493.
49. Id. at 1495.
50. Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1973).
51. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 421-22.
52. Garner v. Giarruso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1336 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Utah Constr. & Mining
Co., 384 U.S. at 422).
53. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 100 (1980).
54. Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1521 n.206 (citing Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 443 (1943)).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). "In determining whether reasonable cause exists the
Commission shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by state or local
authorities in proceedings commenced under state or local law pursuant to the requirements of
"
subsections (c) and (d) ..
56. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.8.
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decisions. "Since enactment of Title VII, the deferral provision has
presented problems in interpretation.""7 "The inclusion of the 'substantial weight' provisions was made without comment by the Senate
and the intended meaning of the words cannot be determined from
legislative history."5 " The Kremer Court stated that Congress intended
that the "substantial weight" requirement indicate "only the minimum
level of deference that the EEOC must afford all state determinations." 9 The Kremer Court reasoned that the "substantial weight" requirement does not bar affording greater preclusive effect and rejected
Justice Blackmun's "interpretation of that provision as a ceiling on the
deference federal courts are obligated to give state court judgments."6 0
The Kremer Court's rationale does not support a principled distinction
between judicial decisions and judicially unreviewed administrative
decisions for purposes of applying Title VII's substantial weight provision and section 1738's full faith and credit directive. The Court's no
full faith and credit statement in Kremer6 has the effect of requiring
federal courts to give only substantial weight to all Title VII section 706
agency administrative decisions. However, under Kremer, any state
judicial decision which meets the minimum requirement of the fourteenth amendment due process clause will deny a Title VII litigant a
right to a federal trial de novo.
IV.

PRECLUSION PRINCIPLES APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

In Utah Construction, the Supreme Court held that preclusion doctrines apply to unreviewed adjudicatory administrative decisions.6 2 In
Kremer, the Supreme Court has, by implication excluded the application of the Utah Construction preclusion doctrine to administrative decisions involving Title VII's substantial weight directive. In Kremer,
Justice White cites Utah Construction for the proposition that "res j udicata applies to decisions of an administrative agency acting in a judicial
capacity."6 3 However, Justice White also stated that unreviewed administrative determinations by state agencies should not preclude a
57. Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered The EqualEmployment OpportunityAct of 1972,
40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 867 (1972). For instance, the EEOC has satisfactorily worked out a
procedure whereby it forwards complaints to state agencies when complainants have first filed a
charge with the EEOC, in spite of the directive of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) that no charge be filed
with the EEOC until 60 days after the beginning of state proceedings.
58. Id. at 866-67 n.279. "This failure to indicate the specific meaning of the term [substantial
weight] leaves an unknown factor in the law." 1d.
59. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470. See also Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1505.
"Interpreted in light of its purpose, the substantial weight directive would seem to state only the
minimum weight, that the E.E.O.C. must give to state findings, not an implicit maximum."
60. Id. at 470 n.8.
61. Id. at 470 n.7.
62. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. at 394.
63. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 484-85 n.26.
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trial de novo in Title VII cases because "it is settled that the decision of
the EEOC does not preclude a trial de novo in federal court."6 4 In
Kremer the Court's refusal to apply preclusion principles to unreviewed administrative decisions is subject to the same criticism directed
at the Second Circuit.6 5
The Second Circuit refuses to grant preclusive effect to purely administrative decisions, even if the administrative agency employed formal, adversarial procedures. It will, however, apply preclusion
doctrines to state administrative decisions if the complainant has initiated state court review of those decisions. This formalistic distinction
• . .misconstrues 66
Title VII's intent, section 1738, and traditional preclusion principles.
The Kremer Court's refusal to grant preclusive effect to unreviewed
state administrative decisions is difficult to support with the Court's
limited analysis. Justice White did not reconcile his conclusion that
unreviewed state administrative decisions are not entitled to the protection of the preclusion doctrine with the Court's holding in Utah Con67
I sce
mr
struction.
Itisclearly more consistent with general rules for the
Supreme Court to subsequently decide that Title VII's substantial
weight requirement does not implicitly repeal section 1738 as it relates
to the application of full faith and credit to unreviewed state administrative decisions. "Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one. ...""
Section 1738, as a specific statute, should not be controlled by the provisions of Title VII. One may conclude from Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion and the holding of the Court in Kremer that the Court has
adopted the position that the 1972 amendments show that the substantial weight requirement implicitly restricts a federal court's authority to
apply the full faith and credit doctrine to unreviewed state administrative decisions.69 Justice Stevens said, "Both the text of Title VII and its
legislative history indicate that Congress intended the claimant to have
at least one opportunity to prove his case in a de novo trial in court."'
The Court may effect at least a partial repeal of section 1738 in a subsequent case where the Kremer unreviewed administrative decision issue
is presented. Congress intended for a complainant to bring a Title VII
suit despite the termination of his state agency "proceedings" without
64. Id. at 470 n.7.
65. See Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1519-23.
66. Id. at 1521-22.
67. Id. at 1521, "The narrow issue in Utah Construction concerned the effect that a federal
court must give to federal administrative adjudications."
68. Radzanover v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (quoting Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974)).
69. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 508-10.
70. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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regard to the nature of those administrative decisions.7" Thus, the
Court could reason that Congress referred to state administrative
processing of discrimination claims and not judicial review of agency
decisions, when it referred to "proceedings" in sections 706(b) and (c).
Simultaneously, the Court could also state that Congress intended to
exclude a state court trial on the merits of the complainant's claim as
beyond the scope of the term "proceedings."
Such a hypothetical decision would be buttressed by the fact that the
procedures available in state court closely approximate those available
in federal court. Moreover, the policies favoring preclusion under 28
U.S.C. section 1738 would be considerably stronger if the merits
72 of the
discrimination claim had been settled by the state court itself.
The Kremer Court inappropriately concluded that "state proceedings
need to do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements
of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause in order to qualify
for full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law. ' 73 A Title VII case
"in which an adverse agency decision has been reviewed and upheld by
a state court" 74 should require more than merely meeting due process
standards to qualify for full faith and credit. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion criticizes the majority's due process logic.
[T]he Court concluded that minimal due process standards provide
safeguards sufficient to warrant denying a discrimination victim federal
remedies if a state court rejects his request to overturn an adverse state
agency decision. In Title VII, Congress wanted to assure discrimination victims more than bare due process it wanted them to have the
benefit of a vigorous effort to eliminate discrimination. By affording
some discrimination complainants 7less,
the Court contravenes the con5
gressional intent behind Title VII.
Justice Stevens has suggested a more appropriate test which includes
more than minimal due process considerations for determining when
an adverse agency decision should be given preclusive effect. If the
judicial review "is the equivalent of a de novo trial on the merits, then I
would agree that the analysis in the Court's opinion leads to the conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 forecloses a second lawsuit in federal
court."7 6 Justice Stevens concludes that the judicial review in Kremer
is not the equivalent of a trial de novo on the merits and therefore
71. Id. at 494 n.10. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 481.
74. Id. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 498-99 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 509-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "But as Justice Blackmun has demonstrated, [citations omitted] that is not the character of the relevant judicial review in New York. The New
York court's holding that the agency decision was not arbitrary or capricious merely establishes as
a matter of law that a rational adjudicator might have resolved the discrimination issue either
way. It is therefore entirely consistent with § 1738 for a federal district court to accept the New

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss2/5

12

Weeden: The Effect of Section 706 State Agency Proceedings upon Subsequen
TITLE VII CLAIMS

should not bar a federal claim under Title VII. Neither Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion nor the majority opinion attempts to support
with consistent analysis Justice White's suggestion in dictum that it is
clear that unreviewed administrative determinations by state agencies
should not preclude a litigant from a federal trial de novo even if such a
decision were to be afforded preclusive effect in a state's own courts.7 8
Justice White's comments do not suggest whether such an agency decision would prevent a trial de novo in state court.
V.

KREMER DICTUM: AN IMPLIED REPEAL OF

28 U.S.C. § 1738

Ironically, the Court's decision in Kremer is premised on the conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires federal courts to afford the same
full faith and credit to state court judgments that would apply in the
state's own court. 79 The Court created a paradox: it suggested that
unreviewed state administrative decisions are not subject to application
of the full faith and credit doctrine. In making this suggestion, the
Court did not consider or discuss whether such a denial of full faith
and credit has the effect of repealing section 1738's application to unreviewed state administrative decisions rendered as a result of Title VII's
section 706(c) proceedings. It is well-established that a section 706(c)
proceeding is required when an alleged incident of employment discrimination takes place in a state or locality which has laws prohibiting
such discriminatory conduct. The state or locality must have established an "authority to grant or seek relief from such [unlawful conThe
duct] or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto."'
EEOC will not process a charge of discrimination until the state remedy has been utilized and sixty days have lapsed, or the state proceedings have ended. 8'

Articulating a principled rationale for the implied repeal of section
1738 in a Title VII section 706(c) proceeding involving an unreviewed
administrative decision is a difficult task because "Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state court
judgments whenever the courts of the state from which the judgments
emerged would do so.' ' 2 In analyzing whether the Court should, in a
subsequent decision, effect a repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 in a section
706(c) proceedings, the Court should decide whether Title VII's limited
York judgment as having settled that proposition and then to proceed to resolve the discrimination issue in a de novo trial."
77. Id.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 470 n.7.
1d. at 466.
Id. at 469.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
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deferral provisions and the full faith and credit provisions are "in irreconcilable conflict in the sense that there is a positive repugnancy between them or that they cannot mutually coexist."' 83 Courts must give
effect to two statutes which can exist at the same time, unless Congress
has expressed a contrary intent.14 "The intention of the legislature to
repeal must be clear and manifest." 5 Title VII, by its express terms,
does not prevent a litigant from suing in federal court after he has litigated his cause of action before either a state administrative agency or
a state court.8 6 However, the available legislative history of Title VII
indicates that Congress never intended to grant a Title VII litigant an
absolute right to relitigate his claim in federal court.8 7 Senator Dirksen
strongly opposed the litigation of a single claim before both state courts
and federal courts:
What a layering upon layer of enforcement. What if Court orders differed in their terms or requirements? There would be no assurance that
they would be identical. Should we have the Federal forces of justice
pull on one arm, and the State forces 88of justice tug on the other?
Should we draw and quarter the victim?
Congress wanted to apply preclusion rules "completely to 'adequate'
state decisions. '"89 This does not mean that res judicata will automatically be granted to a state court decision so as "to bind the federal
courts."9 "Other well defined federal policies, statutory or constitutional, may compete with those policies underlying section 1738."'"
The Kremer Court did not adequately identify or discuss appropriate
policy objections against granting preclusive effect to the unreviewed
decisions of state administrative agencies. Specifically, the Court did
not discuss the need to examine the state agency decision to determine
whether the complainant had been afforded an opportunity to have his
claim fully judged on its merits. This need arises because of the different types of state agency action, which range from investigatory and
conciliatory procedures to hearings designed to adjudicate the claim
and afford complainants a full opportunity to participate in the hearings. If federal courts give preclusive effect to state agency decisions
that are not the result of an adjudicatory process, claimants are thereby
83. Radzanoever, 426 U.S. at 155.
84. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
85. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
87. Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1496.
88. See 110 CONG. REC. 6449 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen).
89. Jackson, Matheson & Riskorski, supra note 5, at 1496.
90. Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 274 (2d Cir. 1979).
91. Id. (quoting American Manneto Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972)).
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denied the opportunity to have the merits of their claim considered at
any level of the Title VII process.
VI.

ALEXANDER AND MITCHELL RECONSIDERED

The Kremer Court should have fully discussed its policy justification
for suggesting that the preclusion principles of section 1738 do not apply in those cases involving Title VII's "deferral" provisions, by reconsidering the broad policy issues articulated in both Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo. 92 and Mitchell v. NationalBroadcasting Co. 91 In
Alexander a black employee filed a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement after he was discharged by his former employer,
Gardner-Denver. The collective bargaining agreement provided that
"there shall be no discrimination against any employee on account of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry."9 4 The employee
alleged that he was discharged because of racial discrimination. After
Gardner-Denver rejected the claim of racial discrimination, the employee's claim was heard before an arbitrator, pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement between the employee's union and the employer.
Before the arbitration hearing, the employee filed, with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, a racial discrimination complaint which was
referred to the EEOC. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the
employer retained "the right to hire, suspend or discharge [employees]
for proper cause." 9 The arbitrator ruled that the employee was discharged for cause. After the EEOC's subsequent decision that there
was no reasonable ground to believe that the employer had violated
Title VII, the employee filed an action in federal district court alleging
that he was discharged because of his race. The district court granted
the employer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the employee was bound by the prior arbitral decision and had no right to sue
under Title VII.96 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 7 The Supreme Court reversed and held that an employee's
claim in a trial de novo under Title VII is not precluded by prior submission of the claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination
clause of a collective bargaining agreement.9 8
In Mitchell a black female employee was dismissed by her employer,
National Broadcasting Company. After her dismissal, the employee
filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

415 U.S. 36 (1974).
553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1979).
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 39.

Id.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36.
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(NYHRD), charging that she had been denied "equal terms, conditions
and privileges of employment because of her race and color."9 9 The

NYHRD conducted an investigation. The investigation was not extensive" °° and consisted of two informal conferences attended by the dismissed employee, officials of the NYHRD and National Broadcasting
Company attorneys. The regional director of NYHRD dismissed the
complaint "on grounds of lack of probable cause."' 1 The decision was
affirmed by the NYHRD Appeal Board and subsequently by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. The former employee also filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
complaining that her former employer had violated Title VII. The
EEOC did not act on her complaint for almost a year, and then issued
a separate finding of no probable cause with respect to the employee's
charges of racial discrimination. Although the employee received notice of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, a Title VII proceeding was
never begun in the federal courts. Instead the employee filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in federal district court. The complaint,
alleging that the employee's dismissal was racially motivated, sought
punitive damages and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the
complaint by granting a summary judgment in favor of the former employer on res judicata grounds.10 2 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that "a state administrative determination, upheld in
the state0 3courts, is res judicata of a subsequent federal civil rights
action." 1
The Kremer Court made explicit that "our statement in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver that 'final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is
vested with federal courts' . . . should not be read to imply, that by

vesting 'final responsibility in one forum,' Congress intended to deny
finality to decisions in another.'" The Court's statement in Alexander
that in general a submission of a Title VII claim to one forum "does
not preclude a later submission to another' ' 5 is now the exception
rather than the rule. A reasonable interpretation of the Court's holding
in Kremer indicates that, as a general rule, submission of a Title VII
claim to a judicial forum will preclude a litigant from a Title VII trial
99. Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 266 n. 1.
100. Id. at 267.
101. "Before the State Division may dismiss a complaint of discrimination for lack of probable cause, 'it must appear virtually that as a matter of law the complaint lacks merit.' " Id. at 270
(quoting Mayo v. Hopeman Lumber & Mfg. Co., 33 A.D.2d 310, 313, 307 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695
(1970)).
102. Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 418 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
103. Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 266.
104. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 477.
105. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48.
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de novo because of the full faith and credit provisions.' 0 6 A Title VII
litigant who submits his claim to a state administrative forum without
judicial review will be allowed to pursue his Title VII rights under applicable federal statutes.'0 7 The denial of finality to a decision of an
administrative forum suggests an implied repeal of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 or
1 8
an exception to the Court's ruling in Utah Construction. 0
"In Allen v. McCurry the Supreme Court recognized the need to develop preclusion rules that accommodate specific federal policies."' 9
Allen states that an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 will not be recognized unless a subsequent statute contains an express or implied partial
repeal."
Therefore, a proper reading of the Kremer Court's suggestion that full faith and credit will not be given to an unreviewed state
administration agency decision has effected a partial repeal of 28
U.S.C. § 1738. "There is no claim here that Title VII expressly repealed § 1738."'1
[There] are two well settled categories of repeal by implication(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the
later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a
repeal of the earlier act. But, in either case, the intention of the legisla112
ture to repeal must be clear and manifest ....
The Kremer Court has implicitly determined that Title VII section 706
agency proceeding and 28 U.S.C. § 1738's application to unreviewed
administrative determination are in irreconciliable conflict. The Court
has interpreted the civil action to follow a decision by federal and state
administrative agencies to be a trial de novo. 113 The Kremer Court has
by implication placed the same limits on the state agency proceedings
that Congress explicitly placed on the EEOC. Under the rationale of
the Kremer Court, neither federal nor state administrative decisions
can prevent a federal trial do novao" 4
The Kremer Court's rationale creates a conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 1738
in a section 706 agency hearing because the Court has apparently reasoned that Congress never intended for either a state or federal administrative determination to finally adjudicate a Title VII claim. The
106. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 478.
107. Id. at 470 n.7.
108. Utah Constr. & Mining Co, 384 U.S. at 422.
109. Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1513 (citing Allen, 449 U.S. at 416-18).
110. Allen, 449 U.S. at 99.
III. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468.
112. Id. (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)) (quoting
Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1963)).
113. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 469.
114. Id. at 470 n.8.
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Court created an identical role for the state and federal fair employment agencies. This may be hard to accept since state agencies, unlike
the EEOC, are given the power to adjudicate and often "conduct a
quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing" if it finds a complaint to be based
upon probable cause." 5 The relationship of Title VII to section 1738
does not fall within the second category of a later act intended as a
substitute for an earlier one because Congress enacted Title VII to
eliminate racial discrimination." 6
VII.

SUBSTANTIAL POLICY REASONS REQUIRE PARTIAL REPEAL OF

28 U.S.C. § 1738
There are two arguments in favor of a partial repeal of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 as it applies to section 706 agency proceedings: the importance
of agency conciliation efforts in civil rights litigation, and the undesirability of allowing state agency proceedings to preempt claims brought
under Title VII."17 Without judicial review of the state agency determination, a number of considerations would weigh against barring 1 8 a
subsequent federal trial de novo on grounds of the full faith and credit
provision of section 1738. These include "the undesirability of allowing the deferral of a Title VII claim to a state agency to fore'
a Title VII action and "the usefulness of having a state
close" 119
administrative agency attempt the conciliation of discrimination claims
prior to filing an action in federal court." 2 0 The deferral requirements
of Title VII do not contemplate resort to state judicial review.' 2 ' It is
clear from the Kremer decision that the Court has construed the section
706(b) substantial weight provision so as to simultaneously and paradoxically effect a partial repeal of section 1738 as applied to section 706
administrative proceedings. The Court reached this conclusion even
though the statutory provisions for section 706 judicial proceedings are
neither in irreconciliable conflict with nor intended as a substitute for
section 1738.122 The Court stated in Kremer that both Title VII's limited deferral and its substantial weight provisions are directed toward
administrative cooperation and lend no evidence of Congressional intent to compromise or circumscribe the validity of state judicial proceedings.123 Under the Court's administrative cooperation logic, a
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1519.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 268.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975)).
Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 275.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.8.
Id.
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section 706(b) agency decision will be given substantial weight. The
Court has implicitly repealed section 1738 by construing section 706(b)
as a ceiling on the deference federal courts are permitted to give state
agency proceedings.
Justice Blackmun incorrectly interpreted section 706(b) as a "ceiling
on the deference federal courts are obligated to give state court judg'
ment."124
The Kremer Court has effected a partial repeal of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 through what Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion correctly
describes as a "schizophrenic reading of section 706(b).' 2 5 He stated
that:
According to the Court, when Congress amended 706(b) so that state
"proceedings" would be accorded "substantial weight," it meant two
different things at the same time: it intended state agency "proceedings" to be accorded only "substantial weight" while simultaneously,
state judicial "proceedings" would be26 accorded "substantial weight and
more"-that is, "preclusive effect."'
The Court implicitly concedes, when it permits trial de novo suits in
federal court at the conclusion of section 706 agency proceedings, that
substantial weight "is a very different concept from 'preclusive effect.' "27 The former does not foreclose a subsequent Title VII suit
while the latter requires that a subsequent Title VII suit be foreclosed
by full faith and credit. The Kremer Court has construed section
706(b) so as to apply the concept of preclusive effect to state judicial
proceedings only.
The first argument in favor of a partial repeal of section 1738 under
the Kremer Court's preclusion rationale is that Title VII claimants
should have a choice as to whether or not they wish to have their discrimination claims adjudicated in a judicial forum despite prior administrative attempts at dispute resolution. The second argument rests on
the premise that partial repeal would prevent a situation where an employer's appeal of a state agency decision to a state court would have
the effect of denying a Title VII claimant the opportunity to have his
claim heard on the merits in a trial de novo in an appropriate judicial
forum.
In Mitchell, the court stated, "if res judicata applies in these [similar]
circumstances, then deferral to state agencies pursuant to Title VII creates the risk that by appealing any agency determination favorable to
claimant, the respondent can force the claimant into state court and
foreclose a federal action under a section 1981 claim."' 28 The Second
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at 489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 275 n. 13; Comment, Civil Rights - Civil Procedure: State Appellate
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Circuit extended the Mitchell rule to Title VII cases in Sinicropi v. Nassau County.' 29 The partial repeal of section 1738 in a section 706

agency case would take away the incentive for a prudent discrimination
complainant to make every "effort to prevent the state agency from
reaching a final decision."130 Without a partial repeal, a complainant
who prevails after a full hearing runs the risk that his adversary may
seek judicial review. The Title VII complainant could find himself
closed out of federal court if a state court decides that the agency's
adverse decision is unsupported by sufficient evidence. 13 ' In some fu32
ture case, the Court should find such a result "inimical to Title VII',1
and hold that such reviewed administrative determinations should not
preclude a trial de novo in federal court, even "if such a decision were
to be afforded preclusive effect in a state's own court. . . ." 133 In denying preclusive effect to an employer-initiated appeal of a section 706
agency decision, the Court should reject the argument that permitting
an employee to have his claim considered in both the administrative
and judicial forums would be unfair since this would mean that the
employee but not the employer would be entitled to apply the preclusion principles of section 1738.13' An employer does not receive unfair
treatment with respect to such a judicially reviewed administrative "decision for the simple reason that Title VII does not provide employers
with a cause of action against employees." 1 35 Moreover "[a]n employer
cannot be the victim of discriminatory employment practices." 1 36 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that limiting the application of the preclusion rules to section 706 administrative decisions
that were subjected to judicial review at the claimant's solicitation is
indispensable to protecting the claimant's right to choose a trial de novo
in federal court. "Although Sinicropi suggests that complainants were
meant to have such a choice, nothing in Title VII's legislative history
supports that assertion."'' 37 However, Title VII's legislative
history
13
does not contradict the position of the Sinicropi court. 1
Court Judgment on Employment Discrimination is Res Judicatain Subsequent Federal Action Under
Section 1981 ofthe CivilRights Act of 1866, 62 MINN. L. REV. 987, 1000-04 (1978). The author of

the comment correctly predicted the Mitchell decision would apply in Title VII cases. Mitchell
held that judicial review of a state agency decision in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) would bar a subsequent federal action because of res judicata. 553 F.2d at 265. "Before Mitchell res judicata had
rarely been applied to bar a federal employment discrimination claim." Comment, supra, at 1000.
129. 601 F.2d 60 (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979).
130. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 504 n.18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 470 n.7.
134. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
135. Id. at 54.
136. Id.
137. Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 5, at 1522.
138. Id.
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The Sinicropi court characterized the fact that the claimant submitted her case to the state courts for review as a "crucial factor" in its
determination that subsequent litigation in federal court was barred by
resjudicata.' 3 9 A partial repeal of section 1738 which denies finality to
a state court judgment rendered as a result of the employer choosing a
state court forum would clearly eliminate the incentive for a complainant to "thwart all state proceedings."' 4 ° A successful state discrimination complainant should not be barred by section 1738 because the
employer pursued judicial review of a section 706 administrative
agency decision.
CONCLUSION

Prior to Kremer, the rule of Utah Construction required federal
courts to give preclusive effect to state administrative agency decisions
made when the agency acted in a judicial capacity. Kremer has suggested that the Utah Construction rule is no longer applicable in Title
VII cases. Instead of looking to the proceedings of the state section 706
agency to determine whether or not it has noted in a quasi-judicial capacity as an adjudicator of the employment discrimination claim, the
Kremer Court looked to whether the agency order had been reviewed
by the state's courts. Those agencies' decisions adequately reviewed by
a state court are to be given preclusive effect. The Kremer Court suggests that unreviewed agency decisions cannot be given preclusive effect, whether or not the state agency has adjudicated the employment
discrimination claim upon its merits.
Traditional preclusion rules require that unreviewed state agency determinations be separated into those which have been the result of the
agency acting as a judicial forum and those which have not. Congress
intended that Federal Title VII remedies supplement the employment
discrimination remedies of the states. Therefore, section 1738 must be
impliedly repealed to allow federal courts to deny res judicata effect to
unreviewed state agency decisions when the agency has adequately
provided an adjudication upon the merits to an employment discrimination complainant.

139. Sinicropi, 601 F.2d at 62 (citing Mitchell, 553 F.2d at 275-76).
140. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 504 n. 18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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